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2Is Foreign Direct Investment a Channel of Knowledge Spillovers?
Evidence from Japan’s FDI in the U.S.
Abstract
Recent empirical work has examined the extent to which international trade fosters
international “spillovers” of technological information.  FDI is an alternate, potentially
equally important channel for the mediation of such knowledge spillovers.  I introduce a
framework for measuring international knowledge spillovers at the firm level, and I use
this framework to directly test the hypothesis that FDI is a channel of knowledge
spillovers for Japanese multinationals undertaking direct investments in the United
States.  Using an original firm-level data set on Japanese firms’ FDI and innovative
activity, I find evidence that FDI increases the flow of knowledge spillovers both from
and to the investing Japanese firms.
3I. Introduction
“To what extent does technological knowledge flow across national borders?”
“By what means are these knowledge flows mediated?”
These questions have received an increasing amount of attention over the last
decade, as some of the leading scholars in international economics have focused
considerable research effort on the broad topic of knowledge spillovers.  Ethier (1982),
Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991), Feenstra (1996), and, perhaps most notably, Grossman
and Helpman (1990, 1991), among others, helped place this general subject in the
forefront of international economic research with their pathbreaking work on models of
endogenous innovation-driven growth and trade.
Incorporating technological progress into trade models can make a real difference,
at least in theory.  Technological considerations can expand the gains from trade.  Liberal
trade policies provide domestic entrepreneurs with the possibility of exploiting global
markets rather than merely national ones; inducing more R&D (or greater specialization);
and generating higher levels of economic growth or welfare.  Moreover, imported
manufactured goods can -- in some of these models -- serve as channels of knowledge
spillovers.  Domestic firms can “learn from” the foreign goods they purchase by reverse-
engineering the technological innovations embodied in these goods.  In this way, the
“knowledge stock” on which domestic innovators can build is enlarged through liberal
trade.1  While less thoroughly explored in formal models, the literature also suggests the
possibility of a “learning-by-exporting” effect in which firms learn to improve the quality
                                                 
1 Technological considerations can also complicate the gains from trade.  If knowledge spillovers are
national rather than international in scope, then comparative advantage itself can become path dependent,
4of their products and production processes through contact with more advanced foreign
competitors in global export markets.
These ideas have been enthusiastically received by the international economics
research community, in part because they seem to considerably strengthen the case for
open trade policies by introducing potential dynamic gains from trade to complement the
traditional static gains from trade.  However, the empirical evidence on the degree that
international knowledge spillovers are mediated by the flow of goods has been, at best,
mixed.2  Furthermore, a number of carefully executed microeconometric studies have
failed to find convincing empirical evidence for “learning by exporting.”3
Of course, the flow of goods across countries constitutes only one channel
through which technological knowledge can flow across national boundaries.  An
obvious alternative channel is foreign direct investment.  A number of countries have
policies that encourage or even subsidize multinational investment.  Often, as is the case
in Singapore, Malaysia, and China, these policies are deliberately biased in favor of
multinational firms in “technology intensive” industries.  These preferential policies are
based at least partly on the view that production and/or research activities undertaken by
multinational affiliates within national borders confer greater “spillover” benefits than
imports.  This view receives some support from the managerial literature.  A series of
research reports undertaken by the McKinsey Global Institute has consistently
                                                                                                                                      
and an “accident of history” or a temporary policy that provides one country with a temporary advantage in
an R&D-intensive sector can have long-lasting implications for trade.  See Grossman and Helpman (1991).
2  The recent study by Keller (1998) calls this into question using industry-level data from several OECD
countries.  Work at the aggregate level by Funk (1998) has cast doubt on the original work of Coe and
Helpman (1995).  Work at the firm level by Branstetter (forthcoming) and at the patent level by Jaffe and
Trajtenberg (1996) have emphasized the degree to which knowledge spillovers across national boundaries
are limited, despite the presence of high levels of trade in goods.
3  See Clerides, Lach, and Tybout (1998), Bernard and Jensen (1998), and Aw, Chen, and Roberts (1997)
for examples.
5emphasized the importance of FDI as a channel for the international diffusion of “best
practice” technology and management practices.4  In his widely cited work, Michael
Porter has also emphasized the importance of this channel.5
In an effort to submit these views to careful statistical tests, Ann Harrison,
Magnus Blomstrom, and others have undertaken empirical studies of “spillover” benefits
from FDI.  The work of Harrison and her co-authors, which has been particularly
influential, has used micro-level panel data drawn from developing countries such as
Morocco and Venezuela.6  While these papers do not explicitly model knowledge
spillovers, their presence is inferred from changes in the productivity levels and growth
rates of “indigenous plants” that are associated with the “arrival” of foreign
manufacturing affiliates.  Like the “learning from exporting” studies, these studies fail to
find robust evidence of positive knowledge “spillovers” from multinational investment.7
This paper also examines the role FDI plays in mediating knowledge spillovers,
but does so in a very different economic context and takes a completely different
methodological approach.
First, I examine Japanese FDI in the U.S., rather than in a developing country.
The motivations for this kind of FDI as well as its economic effects could be quite
different from FDI in Morocco or Venezuela.8  In that sense, this paper provides a useful
complement to earlier studies.  Japanese FDI in the U.S. (as opposed to FDI from other
                                                 
4  See, for example, McKinsey Global Institute (1993).
5  See Porter (1990).  Walter Ku mmerle (1997) has undertaken extensive case studies of multinationals’
foreign R&D facilities and how they fit into the overall R&D strategy of the firm.
6  See Aitken and Harrison (1999) and Haddad and Harrison (1993).  For reasons of brevity, I will omit
mention of papers such as Eaton and Tamura (1996) which use aggregate or industry-level data to examine
these and related issues.
7  Related work by Chung, Mitchell, and Yeu g (1996) also casts doubt on the role of FDI as a channel of
knowledge spillovers.
6significant source countries) is of particular interest, because it changed so dramatically
over the course of the 1980s.  A large number of Japanese multinationals shifted from a
position of very limited direct investment (or no direct investment) in the U.S. at the
beginning of my sample period to a position of “substantial” direct investment by the
end.  This large change may help identify the parameters of interest.
Second, I do not follow the earlier convention of using measured changes in TFP
or other revenue-based measures to infer the presence or absence of knowledge
spillovers.  As is well known, conventional measures of productivity can reflect market
power as well as technical efficiency.  When technologically more advanced foreign
affiliates first enter a market, their presence may erode the market power of indigenous
incumbents while -- at the same time -- introducing new production techniques and
technologies from which these same incumbents learn.  Real knowledge spillovers can
take place, yet their effects can be masked in the data by changes in “appropriability
conditions.”
In contrast, this paper presents an alternative framework for measuring the impact
of foreign direct investment on knowledge spillovers using detailed patent data.  I then
use this framework to measure the impact of foreign direct investment in the United
States by a group of Japanese manufacturing firms on knowledge flows from American
firms to these investing Japanese firms and from the investing Japanese firms to
American inventors.  I find evidence foreign direct investment enhances knowledge flows
in both directions.  I also show how this framework could be extended to measure the
                                                                                                                                      
8  Note that most FDI consists of investment fro  advanced industrial economies to other advanced
industrial economies.
7effects of exports and imports on knowledge spillovers, and I offer some observations on
the implications of my findings for the theoretical literature and for policy.
II. Empirical Methodology
Using Patent Citations Data to Infer Knowledge Spillovers
In describing the approach taken in this paper, I need to carefully define what I
mean by the term “knowledge spillovers.”  When I use this term, I refer to the process by
which one inventor learns from the research outcomes of others’ research projects and is
able to enhance her own research productivity with this knowledge without compensating
the other inventors.  In other words, I am referring to the kinds of classic technological
externalities that are at the core of the endogenous growth literature.  A true knowledge
spillover, by my definition, is something that generates further innovation.  I am,
therefore, making a conceptual distinction between knowledge spillovers per se and the
related processes of “imitation” or “technology diffusion,” though it is clear these
phenomena overlap in practice.9
Patent documents provide a potentially rich source of information on knowledge
spillovers.  Every U.S. patent applicant is required to include appropriate citations to the
“prior art” in his or her application.  By explicitly identifying the “prior art” on which the
inventor builds, these citations serve the important legal function of bounding the
innovation protected by the patent document.  Just as academic researchers are expected
to explicitly acknowledge the ideas and findings of others that they use in their own
research (or be open to charges of plagiarism), so patent applicants are expected to
                                                 
9   By restricting the focus of my paper to knowledge spillovers, I am necessarily taking a narrower
approach than have some other papers in this literature, and I freely acknowledge that this narrower
approach excludes much which is of economic interest.
8identify the prior art on which they build (or be open to charges of patent infringement).10
By examining the citations in corporate patent documents, one can see the innovations
the inventors consider to be the “technological antecedents” of their own inventions.11
The legal function citations play in delineating the scope of the intellectual
property rights conferred by a patent creates strong incentives for inventors to get the
number and nature of citations right.  The cost of citing a friend in a scientific paper is
minimal, so it may frequently take place even when little or no knowledge spillover has
taken place.  The cost of extraneous citations in a patent document can be substantial,
because they narrow the scope of the patent by explicitly placing related inventions
outside the scope of the current patent application.  As Jaffe et al. (1993) puts it,
including extraneous citations is “leaving money on the table.”  Likewise, not including
appropriate citations can expose a patent applicant to patent infringement lawsuits or to
sanctions by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.
Patent citations provide as direct a measure of “knowledge spillovers” as
researchers are ever likely to get.  They are perhaps the best answer to the challenge
posed by Paul Krugman.  In his 1991 book, Geography and Trade, Krugman opined
“Knowledge flows … are invisible; they leave no paper trail by which they may be
measured or tracked, and there is nothing to prevent the theorist from assuming anything
about them that she likes.”  In fact, knowledge spillovers do leave a paper trail in the
form of patent citations -- and this information is provided at the level of the individual
                                                 
10  This analogy, while illustrative, is far from exact.  Jaffe, Fogarty, and Banks (1998) find that ome
patent citations are added by either the applicant or the patent examiner for legal or procedural reasons
which have nothing to do with “knowledge spillovers.”  Nevertheless, they also found strong evidence that
patent citations do indeed reflect patterns of knowledge spillovers, albeit with some “noise.”
11  The points in this paragraph have been made and substantiated by Jaffe and his various co-authors, and
some of the language here closely follows Jaffe et. al. (1998).
9innovation.12  The use of patent citations to measure knowledge spillovers has been
pioneered by Adam Jaffe and a set of co-authors.13  Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson
(1993) used patent citations to measure the extent to which knowledge spillovers within
the United States are geographically localized.  Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (1998) used
patent citations to measure the ex-post economic value of corporate patents.  Henderson,
Jaffe and Trajtenberg (1998) analyzed changes in university patenting over time.  In a
series of working papers, Jaffe and Trajtenberg used patent citations to compare
magnitudes of knowledge flows across countries and across technological fields.14
Until now, no one has used patent citations to investigate whether trade or FDI
aids or abets flows of knowledge across national borders.15  This paper takes such an
approach.  It also differs from much of the existing literature in that it links data on
citations with the firm-level characteristics of the cited and citing firms.  Jaffe and his co-
researchers have recently set up a comprehensive database that provides a complete
“citation mapping” of U.S. patent documents from 1963-1996.  The empirical results
presented in this paper use these data to measure knowledge flows from Japanese firms
investing in the U.S. as well as knowledge flows to Japanese firms investing in the U.S.
                                                 
12  Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson (1993) make this very point, also in response to Krugman.
13  See Caballero and Jaffe (1993), Jaffe, Tr jt nberg, and Henderson (1993), and Jaffe and Trajtenberg
(1996) for examples.
14  The contributors to this literature have also pointed out a number of problems with patent citation data.
Among these is the simple fact that not all important innovations are patented.
15  This statement needs qualification, in that two papers examine closely related topics.  Almeida (1996)
examines the citations in patents generated by a small number of foreign semiconductor affiliates.  Frost
(1995) examines the patent citations generated by a larger number of multinational affiliates across a
broader range of industries.  However, neither paper examines the impact of foreign direct investment on
the R&D of the parent firm or the extent to which increases in FDI lead to increases in knowledge
spillovers, as I do in this paper.  This distinction is quite important because, as Rene Belderbos (1999) has
shown, only a tiny fraction of Japanese firms’ total R&D and patenting is conducted through their overseas
subsidiaries.  These subsidiaries may nevertheless play an important role in fostering knowledge spillovers
if they affect the nature of R&D conducted by the parent company.  This pa er directly assesses the
magnitude of that effect.
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I examine whether the patents of Japanese firms with a substantial FDI presence
in the U.S. are more frequently cited by U.S. inventors than those of firms without such
networks.  The existence of data in both the time series and cross-section dimensions
allows us to look at changes in the propensity of U.S. inventors to cite the patents of
specific Japanese firms as those firms increase or decrease their level of FDI in the U.S.
Likewise, I examine whether the patents of Japanese firms show an increased propensity
to cite the patents of U.S. firms when these firms increase their level of foreign direct
investment in the U.S.16  
Estimating the Impact of FDI on Knowledge Spillovers
This simple description of the approach ignores a number of conceptual and
practical difficulties, some of which are outlined below.  First, however, I establish some
notation to guide the discussion.  Let CJit be he number of citations made by the patents
of Japanese firm i filed in year t to the cumulated stock of U.S.-invented patents granted
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Here E[CJit] is a function of the number of patents Japanese firm i ha  taken out in
the U.S. in year t (NJit), the number of potentially cited U.S. patents which exist as of year
t (NAt), the level of firm i’s “FDI presence” in the U.S. in year t (FDIit), and the extent to
which firm i is at a point in the technology space which is “densely populated” by other
U.S. patents (PROXi).  Some Japanese firms might cite U.S. patents more frequently
                                                 
16   Note that all inference will be based on citations from and to the U.S. patents of Japanese firms.  For a
discussion on why this is appropriate, see the Data Appendix.  The Data Appendix also describes how the
U.S. patents of Japanese firms are distinguished from the U.S. patents of “indigenous” American inventors.
I emphasize here that Japanese firms tend to patent their best ideas in both Japan and the U.S.
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simply because they happen to be working on technologies in which a large number of
“indigenous” U.S. inventors are active.  Therefore, spillovers arise from “proximity” in
technology space rather than through establishing and maintaining FDI networks.
If one wishes to control for this “technological proximity,” the existing literature
suggests a way in which it could be done.  The typical Japanese firm in this data set
conducts R&D in a number of technological fields simultaneously.  One could obtain a
measure of a firm's location in "technology space" by measuring the distribution of its
R&D effort across various technological fields.  Let firm i’s R&D program be described
by the vector F, where
),...,( 1 ki ffF =        (2)
and each of the k lements of F represent the firm's research resources and expertise in
the kth technological area.17  From the number of patents taken out in different
technological areas, I can infer what the distribution of R&D investment and
technological expertise across different technical fields has been.   In other words, by
counting the number of patents held by a firm in a narrowly defined technological field, I
can obtain a quantitative measure of the firm’s level of technological expertise in that
field.18
In the same way, I can also compute a vector of location in technology space for
the aggregate of all U.S. inventors, treating them as though they belonged to a single
giant enterprise, and denoting that FUS.  This suggests that PROXi  might be measured as:
                                                 
17  The k areas represent technological areas (based on the technology classification scheme of the U.S.
patent office) rather than industry classifications.  I do control for industry effects elsewhere, but here I aim
to measure t chnological proximity ra her than proximity in a “product market” sense.
18  Obviously, advances in some technological fields are more easily codified into and protected by patents











This is a “technological proximity” coefficient in the spirit of Jaffe (1986).
One may also wish to allow citations to be influenced by the firms’ R&D
spending and by vectors of multiplicative “fixed effects” associated with the citing firm
( ia ) and the (application) year in which the citation takes place (ta ).
19 Including these
fixed effects actually simplifies the equation, provided one is willing to make some
assumptions.  The stock of cumulated potentially citable “indigenous” U.S. patents will
be the same for all Japanese citing firms in each year, so that the NAt  terms are effectively
absorbed into the time dummies.  I am not able to separately identify the effects of time
and cumulated patent stock on citation probabilities, but since my primary focus is on the
partial impact of changes in FDI presence on citations, this is not a concern.  One may
also want to assume that a firm’s location vis-à-vis the set of U.S.-invented patents is
relatively fixed over time, which is implied by my specification of (3).  In that case, the
effect of the PROX measure is absorbed by the firm fixed effect.  Again, the fact that I
cannot separately identify it from the firm effect is of little concern, as my primary focus
is on the impact of changes in FDI on citations.
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position in technology space as long as the “ease of codification” varies across fields in a common way
across firms.
19  Patents are dated by year of application rather than year of grant.  This is important, because it can take
two to three years (sometimes much longer) for the U.S. Patent Office to grant or reject a patent
application.
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where cJit is the log of the number of citations made by Japanese firms’ U.S. patent
applications to “indigenous” U.S. patents,  is the log of the count of U.S. patent
applications of firm i in year t, FDI is one of a number of alternative measures of the FDI
stock of firm i in year t, r is the log of R&D spending of firm i in year t, the ta ’s are time
dummies, the d ’s are industry effects, and I consider the ia  to b  a firm effect,
reflecting firm-specific research productivity and, perhaps, firm-specific but time
invariant differences in the “connectedness” of the firm’s research team to current
developments in U.S. research that might affect its tendency to cite U.S. patents.
The assumption that the technological proximity of a Japanese firm with respect
to U.S. inventors stays fixed over a long period is a strong one.  The data permit me to
allow this proximity measure to vary within firms over time, although I lack sufficiently
rich patent data to do this for all firms or all years.  Allowing for a time-varying measure
of technology proximity imposes a much more stringent statistical test of the impact of
FDI on knowledge spillovers.  After all, it is possible some of the movement of Japanese
firms in “technology space” is induced by the spillovers from American firms, which
they receive through their network of subsidiaries.  Controlling for this movement might
underestimate the total impact of these spillovers.  However, if a positive effect remains
even after controlling for this movement, this is even stronger evidence in favor of the
view that FDI is a channel of knowledge spillovers.20  The specification suggested by this
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20  If firms are simultaneously increasing their FDI in the U.S. and moving “closer” to U.S. firms in
technology space, this new specification allows us to control for the latter effect, picking up only the partial
effect of an increase in FDI on “spillovers” as measured by citations.
14
A potential econometric problem arises due to the possible dependence of the
level of Japanese patenting in the U.S. on the level of citations.  If citations measure
spillovers, and if spillovers increase the research productivity of the firm, then one might
think some of that increased research productivity would show up in increased levels of
U.S. patenting.  This implies it depends on lagged and, perhaps, current values of cJit.  If
the spillover effects are sufficiently strong and the spillover lags are sufficiently short,
this could create an identification problem.  The appropriate solution to this problem is to
formally model the dependence of pit on cJit and estimate that equation as well as (4) as a
system.  I have not taken that step, largely due to the lack of sufficient information on the
“reverse” relationship between the two variables.  As an expedient partial remedy, I
substitute one-period lagged patents, which I (plausibly) assume not be influenced by
future spillovers, into my empirical specifications in place of contemporaneous patents.
The focus of interest will be on the coefficient 2b .  Do firms that increase their
levels of FDI in the U.S. experience an increased tendency to cite U.S. patents?21 A
positive, significant coefficient would suggest the answer is yes.  The reason why one
might expect a positive coefficient is straightforward:  spillovers are not automatic.  To
monitor and understand other firms’ R&D can be a difficult task.  It may be facilitated
enormously by the geographical proximity attained through FDI, through which the cost
of accessing foreign firms’ knowledge assets is reduced.
To put this another way, I hypothesize that the possession of U.S. subsidiaries
provides Japanese firms with a level of direct contact with leading firms in the U.S.
market that they could not otherwise obtain.  This heightened level of contact may occur
                                                 
21  It may be that an acquisition or greenfield investment might not have an immediate impact on the
research of the Japanese parent firm, so various lags of the FDI “stock” will be considered.
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regardless of whether the subsidiary is set up explicitly or entirely for the purposes of
following research trends in the U.S.  It may occur regardless of whether or not the FDI
by the Japanese firm takes the form of “g een ield” new investment or acquisition of
existing U.S. firms.
However, there are also both theoretical and empirical r asons for thinking the
spillover-enhancing effects of acquisition FDI and “greenfield” FDI are different.  The
“internalization” theory of FDI suggests firms establishing greenfield investments abroad
may be exploiting firm-specific technological (and other) assets not possessed by their
foreign competitors.  Thus, Japanese firms establishing new production facilities abroad
may have relatively little to learn from their U.S. counterparts, being more
technologically advanced than these counterpart firms at the time they undertake the
actual investment.  On the other hand, empirical work by a number of authors suggests
that “acquisition FDI” is at least partially motivated by the desire to obtain the
technological assets of the purchased firms.  In fact, Kogut nd Chang (1991, 1996),
Yamawaki (1993), and Blonigen (1997) have all found evidence suggesting that
Japanese acquisitions in the United States are motivated -- at least in part -- by the desire
to “access” American technological strengths.22  I  light of this, I will later break down
Japanese FDI into “acquisition” FDI and “greenfield” FDI and present results based on
total FDI as well as “acquisition” FDI only.23  Note that I am taking a broader view of the
potential spillover benefits of acquisition than others have taken in this literature.  I
hypothesize that by purchasing a firm in the U.S., Japanese firms potentially acquire not
                                                 
22  Wesson (1998) also finds evidence for “asset-seeking” FDI.
23  Because of the richness of my FDI data, I also can (and do) separately examine the impact of Japanese
firms’ U.S. R&D and product engineering facilities on spillovers.  For a more “case-study” based approach
to the impact of foreign R&D facilities on firm innovation, see Kuemmerle (1997).
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only the proprietary knowledge assets of the acquired firm but also entrée into the
informal technological networks and knowledge sharing relationships possessed by the
research personnel of the acquired firm.
This discussion raises the question of how I should treat Japanese firms’ citations
of the U.S. patents of their acquired subsidiaries and, conversely, the citations by the
acquired subsidiaries to the U.S. patents of the Japanese parents.  It would hardly be
surprising to see such citations – in both directions – increase after an acquisition.
However, this would not be evidence of a “spillover” in the sense that unaffiliated U.S.
firms are receiving and providing greater technological externalities vis-à-vis the
Japanese parent firms as a consequence of an increase in the “FDI presence” of those
parent firms.  In recognition of this, I will present results both with and without citations
to and from acquired subsidiaries.  This does not change the qualitative nature of my
conclusions. 24
Of course, for Americans, the question of greater interest may be not what the
Japanese firms have learned through their investments, but what “indigenous” American
inventors have gained from a greater Japanese “presence” in the United States.  A simple
way to measure this through patent citations is to define CAit as the number of citations
made to the cumulated stock of U.S. patents of Japanese firm i in y ar t by the universe of
U.S.-invented patents applied for in year t.  I can then consider CAit  to be a function of
observables and unobserved firm characteristics:
tiit
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24  I thank Jim Rauch for discussions on this point.
17
where the variables have the same definitions as in (1), except for NJit and NAt. Here NJit
stands, not for the number of patents applied for by firm i in year t, but rather the
cumulative stock of patents of firm i as of year t. This is because the number of citations
a Japanese firm receives in a given year is likely to be a function of its cumulative stock
of U.S. patents rather than the number of applications taken out in a particular year.   NAt
stands for the number of potentially citing U.S. patents as of year t.  I have also added a
variable, Age, which is described below.
In their detailed studies of patent citations, Adam Jaffe and his co-authors have
found that it takes time for the knowledge contained in patents to diffuse, such that patent
citations increase over time.  As time passes, the knowledge contained within patents
becomes obsolete, so that patent citations have a tendency to decrease over longer lengths
of time.   Because they are interested in the parameters describing the time path of
diffusion and obsolescence, Jaffe and his co-authors estimate a double exponential
function of the lag between the granting of the cited patent and the grant date of the citing
patent.  My aim here is more modest.  I do not wish to recover the underlying parameters
describing the processes of diffusion or obsolescence.  Rather, I want to control for
differences in the “citedness” of different Japanese firms that are driven by differences in
the age distribution of their patent stocks rather than FDI.  In some specifications, I will
include for each Japanese firm in each year for which I have sufficient data a summary
statistic of the age distribution of their U.S. patent stocks, denoted Age.25
As in equation (4), I begin by assuming the relative proximity of firm i to the set
18
of U.S. patents is fixed over time, take the logs, and produce a linear estimating equation:
iti
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where the variables have the same definitions as in (4), with the exception that pit now
stands for the cumulative stock of patents of firm i as of year t. Again, my interest will
focus on 2b .  Do U.S. inventor’s citations to the patents of Japanese firms increase as the
FDI presence of those firms increases?  A positive, significant 2b  would indicate this.
26
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As a statistical matter, there are a nontrivial number of observations for which the
dependent variable is 0, and hence, the log of the dependent variable is undefined.  There
are two ways to address this problem.  The first and simplest, which is standard in the
older “R&D/productivity” literature, is to add 1 to each observation.  This raises the
concern that this arbitrary transformation of the dependent variable could somehow bias
the results.  The alternative is to use an econometric model where 0 is a natural outcome,
such as a Poisson or Negative Binomial model.  I take both approaches, obtaining broadly
similar results.27
                                                                                                                                      
25  Work by Jaffe and his coauthors suggests that the frequency of citation for a given patent peaks on
average 4-6 years after the granting of the patent.  This summary statistic measures the fraction of the U.S.
patent stock for Japanese firm i in year t which is at this “prime” age.
26  Note that, in this case, the potential “endogeneity problem” of equation (4) does not arise, at least not in
the same way.  There is no reason to think that Japanese patenting in the U.S. is directly increased by
spillovers from Japan to the U.S.
27  The basic framework of the Poisson and Negative Binomial models is laid out in the technical appendix.
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Extending the Framework to Analyze the Impact of Trade on Knowledge Spillovers
Extending this framework to analyze the impact of Japanese exports to the U.S.
on the ability of the exporting firms to “learn from” U.S. technological developments (the
focus of the “learning by exporting” literature) is straightforward.  One can simply insert
measures of export intensity –  the fraction of total revenue derived from exports to the
U.S. market – into equation (4).  Such data exist for many Japanese firms and have been
exploited by Rene Belderbos and his co-authors.28  In principle, it should be feasible to
place measures of export-intensity and FDI presence into the same estimating equation,
allowing the researcher to compare the impact of the two measures on citations.  Thus,
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Likewise, the framework could be extended to measure the impact of Japanese
exports to the U.S. (that is, imports of Japanese goods by American inventors) on the
propensity of U.S. innovators to cite Japanese inventions.  This, “learning from imports,”
is the traditional focus of the “international spillovers” literature.  Thus I could estimate:
tiit
EXPORTSFDI
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In one sense, I am measuring these spillovers at the “micro level,” in that I can relate
them to the characteristics of the spillover “source.”  However, equation (10) does not
take into account the characteristics of the individual U.S. “spillover recipient” firms or
the American inventors from whom the citations come.
                                                 
28  See, for example, B lderbos and Sleuwaegen (1996).
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III. Estimates and Results
I collected data from a number of sources to estimate the specifications described
in the preceding sections.  An abbreviated description of this process is presented in the
Data Appendix.  Further details are available from the author upon request.
Some sample statistics are given in Table 1.  Data on FDI give counts of firms
acquired or established in the U.S.  The unit of analysis in the Kaigai Kigyou Shihon
Shinshutsu data source is that of the enterprise or business.  Some of these acquired or
established enterprises contain several plants and large numbers of employees.  Other
acquired or established firms are smaller.  In principle, one might want to weight counts
of acquired or established enterprises by the size of these enterprises.  In practice that is
difficult, as the data on employment or sales of U.S. affiliates of Japanese firms are not
recorded with consistency.  Branstetter (2000) uses an alternative data source on Japanese
FDI that has more consistent measures of size, although this source looks only at
manufacturing establishments – distribution centers and R&D facilities are not included.
Empirical results suggest size-weighted counts of affiliates or counts of employees yield
results that are no better than those obtained using simple counts of affiliates.
In Table 2, I present linear results with a transformed dependent variable.  The
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In all specifications, real sales is added as an additional control variable.
In the fixed effects results, the impact of “acquisition” FDI is positive and
significant.  The impact of FDI by other measures is generally not statistically significant.
The designation of specifications as (1), (2), and (3) refers to three alternative measures
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of FDI.  (1) counts the cumulative sum of total affiliates, regardless of the means of
establishment or the purpose of the affiliate.  (2) counts only the cumulative sum of
affiliates obtained through acquisition.  (3) c unts only the cumulative sum of affiliates
whose “statement of business purpose” in the FDI data base explicitly identifies it as an
overseas R&D facility.  Although not shown in the table, I experimented with various
lags of the FDI variables.  I found the results of the lags were qualitatively similar to, but
statistically weaker than the results of contemporaneous count measures.  This may
indicate that spillovers occur almost immediately after the acquisition or “greenf eld”
establishment takes place.
The interpretation of the coefficient on the FDI terms is the percentage increase in
“spillovers” (as measured by citations) that results from an additional affiliate.  Thus,
even small coefficients can be indicative of fairly large effects.  The coefficient in the
fifth column, for instance, suggests that a firm that made three acquisitions would
increase the flow of spillovers by more than 30%.29
In Table 3, where I look at citations by U.S. inventors to the Japanese investing
firms, I find in all specifications a positive relationship between FDI and spillovers from





tccitititAit TDrFDIpc eaadbbbb +++++++= å å3210 (12)
In all specifications, sales is used as an additional control.30  The positive relationship
between citations and FDI holds regardless of the exact measure of FDI used.  The table
shows only the results of regressions with contemporaneous measures of FDI, but the
                                                 
29   Of course, this discussion of interpretation begs the question of whether the impact of additional
affiliates is really constant.  This is a que tion which can be investigated with the available data.  Such
investigation is the subject of ongoing research.
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results tend to be qualitatively similar and statistically stronger if the measures of FDI are
lagged by one or two periods.  Again, the coefficients suggest the cumulative effect of a
large increase in the number of affiliates could be quite substantial.  There is no support
in this specification for the notion that greenfield investment should be encouraged while
acquisition should be shunned because it leads to a one-way flow of spillovers back to
Japan.  If anything, the fixed effects results suggest acquired firms are a more effective
channel of spillover to the U.S. than newly established enterprises or even R&D facilities.
However, these linear results need to be viewed with some caution.  For a large
number of observations, the realization of the dependent variable is zero.  The effects of
the transformation required to make these observations “work” in a log-linear framework
may lead to bias.  Fortunately, the econometrics of “count data” is now fairly well
developed.  It is possible to estimate fixed-effects versions of the Poisson and Negative
Binomial models.  Results from these models are presented in Tables 4 and 5.
Results for citations by the patents of Japanese firms to the stock of U.S. patents
are given in Table 4.  Although some of the regression coefficients are smaller than in the
linear case, the relationship between FDI and spillovers as measured in this framework
remains relatively robust.  In fixed effects Poisson and Negative Binomial models, there
is a statistically significant positive relationship for two measures of FDI – acquisition
FDI and R&D facilities.31  I remind the reader the interpretation of the coefficient on the
FDI term continues to have a “semi-elasticity” interpretation.  For example, the number
in the sixth column suggests that setting up an additional R&D lab in the U.S. leads to a
                                                                                                                                      
30  Recall that here, pit refers to the cumulated stock rather than the contemporaneous flow f patents of firm
i in year t.
31  Acquisition FDI is only significant at the 10% level in the Negative Binomial fixed effects regressions.
R&D facilities continue to be significant at the traditional 5% level.
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2.3% increase in spillovers from U.S. inventors.  The number of observations is smaller
here than in the earlier sets of regression results, because the fixed-effects Poisson
estimation routine automatically excludes firms for which the dependent variable never
varies from zero.32
Table 5 shows results for U.S. citations to Japanese patents.  The results in the
table are obtained using 2-period lagged rather than contemporaneous measures of FDI.
Contemporaneous FDI tends to have limited, generally statistically insignificant effects
on spillovers from the Japanese firms to U.S. inventors.  However, lagged FDI measured
by total counts of affiliates is positively (and significantly) correlated with citations.
Counts of (lagged) Japanese R&D facilities, on the other hand, are not statistically
significant.  Although, in keeping with earlier results, the measured impact of acquisition
FDI is larger than total FDI in terms of its absolute magnitude, it is also not statistically
significant at the conventional levels.
Surveying all of the results in Tables 2-5, it is clear that the exact magnitudes of
the key coefficients and the exact levels of statistical significance vary across
specifications, as one might expect.  Nevertheless, the preponderance of the evidence
seems to support the view that FDI is important as a channel of knowledge spillovers.
Tables 6 and 7 provide a robustness check on the earlier results by incorporating a
time-varying measure of technological proximity of Japanese firms with respect to U.S.
invention.  Furthermore, in these regressions, all citations to and from acquire U.S.
subsidiaries are deleted from the total counts.  Table 6 measures spillovers to Japanes
                                                 
32  A full explanation of why this happens would require a formal derivation of the “fixed-effects” version
of the Poisson estimator.  For reasons of space, I do not include such a derivation in this paper.  The reader
is referred to the study by Hausman, Hall, and Griliches (1984).  I note that all regression results in this
paper were run using the program STATA 6.0.
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firms using a fixed effects Negative Binomial estimate of equation (6).  The results are
both smaller and statistically weaker than those presented elsewhere in the paper.  This
may be driven largely by the fact that the inclusion of the additional controls cuts down
the sample size – I lose about one quarter of the observations.33  Ne ertheless, the reader
will note that FDI does have a positive and statistically significant effect on spillovers, as
evidenced by the FDI coefficients presented in columns (1) and (3).  In keeping with the
pattern of my earlier results, the magnitude of the coefficient for “acquisition” FDI is the
largest, but in this case the coefficient falls below the conventional level of statistical
significance.
Table 7 measures spillovers from Japanese firms using controls for both time-
varying technological proximity and the changing age distribution of these Japanese
firms’ U.S. patent stocks.  Again, the results are both smaller and weaker than in some of
the earlier tables.  In introducing both of these additional controls, I lose a number of
observations.  Nevertheless, column (1) clearly shows that (total) FDI has a positive and
statistically significant effect on spillovers to the U.S.  The impact of “acquisition” FDI is
statistically indistinguishable from zero in these regressions, as is the impact of R&D
facilities only.34  Though I do not include these results for reasons of space, I note that
when I include a measure of “age” of the patent stocks but no time-varying measure of
technological proximity (which increases the number of observations by several
                                                 
33   Simply excluding citations to and from the U.S. subsidiaries of Japanese firms has almost no effect on
the results.  The differences in Tables 6-7 seem to be driven by the inclusion of the additional control
variables and the corresponding loss of observations.
34  The reader may note that, in the columns of Table 7, the estimated coefficients on firm-level R&D
spending and sales are negative.  While these results run counter to what one might suspect, it is probably
the case that, controlling for the firms’ technological positions and total level of patenting, information on
R&D spending and sales adds little in terms of explaining how much the firms’ patents are cited year by
year.  Furthermore, it is worth noting that there are large, R&D-intensive firms in Japan actively producing
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hundred), the impact of all FDI measures becomes positive, of approximately the same
magnitude, and both total FDI and establishment of R&D facilities have effects that are
statistically significant at conventional levels.
IV. Conclusions and Further Extensions
Knowledge spillovers do leave a paper trail -- in the form of patent citations.  In
this paper, I exploit this source of data to measure the importance of one form of
international “contact” – foreign direct investment – in mediating flows of knowledge
spillovers across national borders.  I find evidence supporting the proposition that FDI is
indeed a significant channel of knowledge spillovers, both from investing firms to
indigenous firms and fromindigenous firms to investing firms.  These results are quite
different from the results reported by other micro-level studies.  In my view, the
differences in results arise both from a difference of economic context (I look at FDI in
an “advanced” country) and a difference in methodology.  If the establishment of foreign-
affiliated rivals in one’s domestic market increases the opportunity for knowledge
spillovers but also reduces the domestic firms’ ability to appropriate the benefits of these
knowledge spillovers through higher prices or higher sales volumes, then a TFP-based
approach may fail to measure positive knowledge spillovers.
Some interesting policy implications emerge from these results.  Strategy experts
have asserted and case studies have demonstrated that investing abroad, particularly
through acquisition, can be a useful way of tapping into foreign technology networks.
This study upholds this belief with quantitative data drawn from nearly 200 Japanese
multinationals in a wide range of industries.  My findings emphasize the importance of
                                                                                                                                      
in industries which have long since declined in the United States.  The presence of these firms could
account for the negative sign of the R&D and sales coefficients.
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multinational corporations as channels of knowledge spillovers between advanced
countries and suggest that international M&A activity is an important component of that
spillover process.  The results also suggest that the establishment of R&D facilities
abroad can increase a firm’s ability to track foreign technological developments.
Moreover, some of the evidence in this paper also suggests the concerns
expressed by many American policy analysts over the acquisition of U.S. “high-tech”
firms by Japanese multinationals may be misplaced.   FDI generally leads to increas d
knowledge flows in both directions, and in some specifications, the impact of acquisi i n
on knowledge flows from the Japanese parent to American firms is actually larger than
the corresponding impact of greenfield investment.35  While one needs to exercise
caution in extrapolating from these results to other contexts, this could suggest that
national restrictions on FDI and, in particular, on foreign acquisition of domestic firms in
“high-tech” industries, could hamper rather than protect a domestic industry’s
technological development.
In the text, I have shown how my framework could be extended to examine the
importance of exports and imports, that is, the flow of goods, as a channel of knowledge
spillovers.  Ongoing research with Ryuhei Wakasugi seeks to estimate such an extended
model, using Japanese firm-level data on exports to the United States.  I hope the
framework presented in this paper will find application beyond an examination of
Japanese foreign direct investment and exports.  Although Japanese firms are the most
important foreign users of the U.S. patent system, large numbers of British, French, and
                                                 
35   Of course, one needs to exercise caution here.  While the magnitude of the “acquisition FDI” coefficient
is often larger than that of the “total” coefficient, it tends to lose statistical significance when one shifts to
count data models and includes controls for time-varying technological proximity and the age distribution
27
German firms patent in the U.S.  This study could be replicated for multiple OECD
countries, provided micro-level data could be assembled.  Finally, the citations-based
framework used in this paper could potentially serve as the nucleus for a more complete
empirical model of the R&D-intensive multinational firm that links information on
knowledge spillovers derived from patent citations to other “innovative output” measures
of the firm.  Creating such a model is the focus of current research.
                                                                                                                                      
of Japanese firms’ U.S. patent stocks.  Because of this, it is difficult to estimate statistically significant
differences in the impact of different kinds of FDI on knowledge spillovers in most specifications.
28
Bibliography
Aitken, Brian and Ann Harrison, (1999) “Do Domestic Firms Benefit from Foreign Direct Investment?
Evidence from Venezuela” American Economic Review, Vol. 89 (3), pp. 605-618.
Aitken, Brian, Gordon Hansen, and Ann Harrison (1997), “Spillovers, Foreign Investment, and Export
Behavior” Journal of International Economics, Vol. 43 (1-2), pp. 103-32.
Almeida, Paul (1996), “Knowledge Sourcing by Foreign Multinationals:  Patent Citation Analysis in the
U.S. Semiconductor Industry,” Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 17, pp. 155-165.
Aw, Bee, Xiaomin Chen, and Mark Roberts (1997), “Firm-level Evidence on Productivity Differentials,
Turnover, and Exports in Taiwanese Manufacturing,” NBER working paper no. 6235.
Belderbos, Rene (1999), “Overseas innovations by Japanese firms:  A micro-econometrical analysis of
patent and subsidiary data,” working paper 99-1, Hitotsubashi University, Institute of Innovation
Research.
Belderbos, Rene and Leo Sl uwaegen (1996) “Japanese Firms and the Decision to Invest Abroad:
Business Groups and Regional Core Networks,” Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 78, pp.
214-220.
Bernard, Andrew and J. Bradford Jensen (1998), “Exceptional Exporter Performance:  Cause, Effect, or
Both?” Journal of International Economics, Vol. 47 (1), pp. 1-25.
Blomstrom, Magnus and Ari Kokko (1996), “Multinational Corporations and Spillovers,” NBER Working
Paper.
Blonigen, Bruce (1997), “Firm-Specific Assets and the Link Between Exchange Rates and Foreign Direct
Investment,” American Economic Review, Vol. 87 (3), pp. 447-465.
Branstetter, Lee (forthcoming), “Are Knowledge Spillovers Intranational or International in Scope:
Microeconometric Evidence from the United States and Japan” forthcoming in the Journal of
International Economics.
Branstetter, Lee (2000), “Foreign Direct Investment and R&D Spillovers:  Is there a Connection?”
forthcoming in Takatoshi Ito and Anne Krueger, (ds)The Role of Foreign Direct Investment in
Economic Development, U iversity of Chicago Press.
Branstetter, Lee (1996), “Innovation, Knowledge Spillovers, and Dynamic Comparative Advantage:
Evidence from Japan and the United States,” Ph.D. Thesis, Harvard University.
Branstetter, Lee and Mariko Sa akibara (1998), “Japanese Research Consortia:  A Mic oeconometric
Analysis of Industrial Policy,” Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 46 ( 2), pp. 207-233.
Caballero, Ricardo, and Adam Jaffe, (1993), “How High are the Giants' Shoulders?” In: Blanchard, O. and
S. Fischer, eds., 1993 Macroeconomics Annual, MIT Press and National Bureau of Economic
Research, Cambridge.
Caves, Richard (1993), “Japanese Investment in the United States:  Lessons for the Economic Analysis of
Foreign Investment,” The World Economy, Vol. 16, pp. 279-300.
Chung, Wilbur, Will Mitchell, and Bernard Yeung (1996), “Foreign Direct Investment and Host Country
Productivity:  The Case of the American Automotive Components Industry,” manuscript,
University of Michigan, School of Business Administration.
29
Clerides, Sofronis, Saul Lach, and James Tybout (1998), “Is Learning by Exporting Important?  Micro-
Dynamic Evidence from Colombia, Mexico, and Morocco,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.
113 (3), pp. 903-948.
Coe, David and Elhanan Helpman, (1995), “International R&D spillovers,” European Economic Review
Vol. 39, pp. 859-887.
Coe, David and A. Hoffmaister, (1998) “Are There International R&D Spillovers Among Randomly
Matched Trade Partners? A Response to Keller,” working paper.
Cohen, Wesley and Daniel Levinthal (1989), “The Two Faces of R&D,” Ec nomic Journal, Vol. 99
(September), pp. 569-610.
Eaton, Jonathan and Samuel Kortum (1996), “Trade in Ideas:  Patenting and Productivity in the
 OECD,” Journal of International Economics, Vol. 40, pp. 251-278.
Eaton, Jonathan and Samuel Kortum (1998), “Technology, Geography, and Trade,” working paper.
Eaton, Jonathan and Akiko Tamura (1996), “Japanese and U.S. Exports and Investment as
Conduits of Growth," Financial Deregulation and Integration in East Asia, edited by Anne O.
Krueger and Takatoshi Ito.  University of Chicago Press.
Ethier, Wilfred, (1982), “National and International Returns to Scale in the Modern Theory of International
Trade,” American Economic Review, Vol. 72 (3), pp. 389-405.
Feenstra, Robert, (1996), “Trade and Uneven Growth,”  Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 49 (1),
pp. 229-256.
Funk, Mark, (1998), “Productivity, R&D, and the International Diffusion of Knowledge,” Unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Davis.
Frost, Tony (1995), “Multinationals and Spillovers of Technical Knowledge:  A Comparative Institutional
Analysis,” working paper, MIT.
Griliches, Zvi and Jerry Hausman (1986), "Errors in Variables in Panel Data" Journal of Econometrics,
Vol. 31 (1), pp. 93 - 118.
Grossman, Gene and Elchanan Helpman, (1991), Innovation and Growth in the Global Economy.  The MIT
Press, Cambridge.
Grossman, Gene and Elchanan Helpman, (1990), “Comparative Advantage and Long-run Growth,”
American Economic Review, Vol. 80 (4), pp. 796-815.
Haddad, Mona and Ann Harrison (1993), “Are There Positive Spillovers from Direct Foreign Investment?
Evidence from Panel Data for Morocco,” J urnal of Development Economics, Vol. 42 (1), pp. 51-
74.
Hausman, Jerry, Bronwyn Hall, and Zvi Griliches (1984), "Econometric Models for Count Data with an
Application to the Patents-R&D Relationship," Econometrica, Vol. 52 (4), pp.  909-938.
Head, Keith, John Ries, and Deborah Swenson (1995), “Agglomeration Benefits and Location Choice:
Evidence from Japanese Manufacturing Investments in the United States,” Journal of
International Economics, Vol. 38, pp. 223-247.
30
Henderson, R., A. Jaffe, and M. Trajtenberg (1998), “Universities as a Source of Commercial Technology:
A Detailed Analysis of University Patenting, 1965-1988,” Review of Economics and Statistics,
Vol. 80 (1), pp.  119-127.
Jaffe, Adam (1986), "Technological Opportunity and Spillover of R&D: Evidence from Firms' Patents,
Profits, and Market Value," American Economic Review, Vol. 76 (5), pp. 984-1001.
Jaffe, A., M. Trajtenberg, and R. Henderson (1993), “Geographic Localization of Knowledge Spillovers as
Evidenced by Patent Citations,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 108 (3), pp.  577-598.
Jaffe, Adam, and Manuel Trajtenberg (1996), “Flows of Knowledge Spillovers From Universities and
 Federal Labs:  Modeling the Flow of Patent Citations Across Institutional and Geographic
 Boundaries,” NBER Working Paper 5712.
Jaffe, Adam, Michael Fogarty, and Bruce Banks, (1998), “Evidence from Patents and Patent Citations
on the Impact of NASA and Other Federal Labs on Commercial Innovation,” Journal of Industrial
Economics, Vol. 46 (2), pp.  183-205.
Keller, Wolfgang, (1998),  “Are International R&D Spillovers Trade-related?  Analyzing Spillovers among
Randomly Matched Trade Partners,” European Economic Review, Vol. 42,  pp. 1469-81.
Kogut, Bruce and Sea Jin Chang (1991), “Technological Capabilities and Japanese Foreign Direct
Investment in the United States,” Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 73, pp. 401-413.
Kuemmerle, Walter (1997), “Building Effective R&D Capabilities Abroad,” Harvard Business Review,
March-April issue, pp. 61-70.
MacKnight, Susan (1987-1991), Japan’s Expanding U.S. Manufacturing Presence (Washington, D.C.:
Japan Economic Institute).
McKinsey Global Institute (1993), “Manufacturing Productivity,” McKinsey & Company, Washington,
D.C.
Montalvo, Jose and Yishay Yafeh (1994), “A Micro-Econometric Analysis of Technology Transfer:  The
Case of Licensing Agreements of Japanese Firms,” International Journal of Industrial
Organization, Vol. 12 (2), pp.  227-244.
Porter, Michael E. (1990), The Competitive Advantage of Nations,  The Free Press, New York.
Rivera-Batiz, Luiz and Paul Romer, (1991) “Economic Integration and Endogenous Growth,” Qua terly
Journal of Economics, Vol. 106 (2), pp. 531-555.
Scherer, F.M. (1984), “Using Linked Patent and R&D Data to Measure Interindustry Technology Flows,”
in Griliches, ed., R&D, Patents, and Productivity, University of Chicago Press.
Sakakibara, Mariko, and Lee Branstetter (1999), “Do Stronger Patents Induce More Innovation?  Evidence
from the 1988 Japanese Patent Law Reforms,” NBER working paper no. 7066.
Toyou Keizai Publishing Co., Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigyou Souran, 1997, Tokyo, Japan.
Toyou Keizai Publishing Co., Kaisha Shiki Ho, various issues, Tokyo, Japan.
Wesson, Tom (1998), “Asset-Seeking Foreign Direct Investment,” working paper, York University.
31
Data Appendix
The primary source of data on the U.S. FDI of Japanese firms was Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigyou
Souran, published in Japanese by the Toyou Keizai publishing company of Japan.  This source provides
comprehensive data on FDI activity at the firm level.  Data on parent firms’ sales and industry affiliation
were taken from the Japan Development Bank Corporate Finance database.  Data on the U.S. patenting of
Japanese firms were taken from the CASSIS CD-ROM published by the U.S. patent office and later
matched to patent data in the REI database at Case-Western Reserve University.  This amounted to
hundreds of thousands of patents and even larger numbers of citations.  The years of my sample period are
1981 through 1994.
This study uses data on the U.S. patents of 187 Japanese firms (an unbalanced panel) and the
universe of “American” inventors, as determined by the address of the first listed inventor.  Of course,
some “American” inventors work for Japanese firms or subsidiaries of Japanese firms.  These inventors are
specifically excluded from the sample of “American” patents in the specifications reported in Tables 6 and
7, as is indicated in the text.  “American” inventors working for non-U.S. multinationals are considered
“American” for the purposes of this study.  Conversely, foreign inventors (that is, inventors with a non-U.S.
address) working for U.S. firms are not counted as part of the body of “American” inventors.  This is
intentional, in that the purpose of this study is to examine the impact of the geographic proximity conferred
by FDI in the U.S. on spillovers to and from inventive activity in that country.  It is also worth noting that
the vast majority of R&D activity conducted by U.S. multinationals is undertaken with the boundaries of
the United States.
For this study, there was really no alternative to the use of data on Japanese firms’ U.S. patents, as
it has proven impossible to date to obtain reliable information on the citations in Japanese patent
applications.  This, in part, stems from the very different set of legal requirements for citation that firms
have faced under Japanese patent law.  Nevertheless, interviews with leading Japanese firm executives and
empirical studies such as Branstetter and Sakakibara (1998) and Sakakibara and Branstetter (1999) suggest
that Japanese firms seek to patent all their valuable ideas in both the U.S. and Japan, so that trends in their
U.S. patents should be reflective of their total innovative activity.  Note that Japanese firms are by far the
most important foreign users of the U.S. patent system, accounting for roughly one quarter of all patents
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granted by the U.S. during the latter 1980s and early 1990s.  Data on the R&D spending of Japanese firms
were taken primarily from survey data published (in Japanese) in the Kaisha Shiki Ho quarterly series of
reports on Japanese publicly traded firms.
Technical Appendix
Sketch Derivation of Poisson and Negative Binomial Regression Models
Here, I summarize the results of the derivation of count data estimators by Hausman, Hall, and
Griliches.  The notation below borrows extensively from the presentation of these basic results found in
Montalvo and Yafeh (1994).
The Poisson estimator posits a relationship between the dependent and independent variables such that
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Econometric estimation is possible by estimating the log likelihood function using standard maximum
likelihood techniques.  The negative binomial estimator generalizes the Poisson by allowing an additional
source of variance.  I allow the Poisson parameter lambda to be randomly distributed according to a gamma
distribution.  Thus defining lambda as before
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X
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Using the relationship between the marginal and conditional distributions, I can write
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If the density function is assumed to follow a gamma distribution, then the Poisson model becomes a
Negative Binomial model:
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Integrating by parts and using the fact that
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yields the following distribution
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with
E nit it( ) = a        (23)
and
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This can also be estimated using maximum likelihood techniques.  The log likelihood function becomes




it it it it it it( ) log ( ) log ( ) log ( ) log( ) ( )log( )b l l l d l d= + - - + + - + +å å G G G 1 1
       (25)
with
V n eit
Xit( ) ( ) /= +b d d1        (26)
Thus, the coefficients are estimated using standard maximum likelihood techniques.
In the interests of space, I will not reproduce here the derivation of fix d-effects versions of the
Poisson and Negative Binomial models.  The reader is referred to Hausman, Hall, and Griliches (1984).
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Table 1 Sample Statistics for Japanese Firms
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Patents 49.57 140.69 0 1178
R&D 22,869.82 53,793.95 50 445,212.3
Citations to U.S.-
invented patents
106.45 325.38 0 2820
Citations by U.S.-
invented patents
89.28 312.91 0 4348
Sales 351,525.6 741,148.2 2,720.623 9,025,592
U.S. affiliates 1.44 2.68 0 35
Units of sales and R&D figures are millions of 1990 Japanese yen.
Table 2 Spillovers to Investing Japanese Firms
Linear Regressions













log R&D   .0394   .0412     .0406   .1187   .1188   .1190
 (.0319)  (.0321)    (.0319)  (.0461)  (.0460)  (.0461)
log sales   .1042   .0941   .0949   .1879   .1981   .1877
 (.0428)  (.0423)  (.0424)  (.1030)  (.1029)  (.1042)
log U.S. patents   .9572   .9518   .9541   .6012   .5911   .5997
 (.0166)  (.0167)  (.0167)  (.0285)  (.0286)  (.0285)
U.S. FDI  -.0119   .0175  -.0035  -.0081    .1057  -.0070
 (.0086) (.0388)  (.0192)  (.0107)   (.0048)  (.0225)
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes N.A. N.A. N.A.
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(1) Indicates FDI measured as cumulative counts of all U.S. subsidiaries.
(2) Indicates FDI measured as cumulative counts of acquired U.S. subsidiaries.
(3) Indicates FDI measured as cumulative counts of U.S. R&D/product development facilities.
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Table 3   Spillovers from Investing Japanese Firms
Linear Regressions













log R&D   .0593   .0556    .0617   .0332   .0277   .0341
 (.0254)  (.0257)    (.0255)  (.0274)  (.0276)  (.0275)
log sales   .1885   .2260   .1847   .0573   .1012   .0358
 (.0399)  (.0398)  (.0400)  (.0610)  (.0615)  (.0621)
log U.S. patents   .6066   .6096   .6154   .4769   .4740   .4879
 (.0151)  (.0152)  (.0149)  (.0205)  (.0182)  (.0206)
U.S. FDI   .0397   .0623   .0733   .0421    .0839   .0644
 (.0062) (.0279)  (.0132)  (.0063)   (.0287)  (.0134)
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes N.A. N.A. N.A.
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(1)  Indicates FDI measured as cumulative counts of all U.S. subsidiaries.
(2)  Indicates FDI measured as cumulative counts of acquired U.S. subsidiaries.
(3)  Indicates FDI measured as cumulative counts of U.S. R&D/product development facilities.
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Table 4 Spillovers to Japanese Firms
Poisson and Negative Binomial Regressions













Poisson Poisson Poisson NB NB NB
log R&D   .0446   .0452     .0450   .1143   .1160   .1215
 (.0098)  (.0098)    (.0098)  (.0327)  (.0328)  (.0329)
log sales   .3220   .3102     .2624  -.1842  -.1851   -.1871
 (.0178)  (.0176)    (.0187)  (.0238)  (.0238)    (.0238)
log U.S. patents   .6754   .6728     .6762   .8096   .8084     .8079
 (.0067)  (.0067)    (.0067)  (.0208)  (.0208)    (.0207)
U.S. FDI   .0006   .0351    .0136   .0031   .0427    .0227
 (.0008)  (.0053)   (.0015)  (.0035)  (.0246)   (.0065)
Industry Dummies N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(1)  Indicates FDI measured as cumulative counts of all U.S. subsidiaries.
(2)  Indicates FDI measured as cumulative counts of acquired U.S. subsidiaries.
(3)  Indicates FDI measured as cumulative counts of U.S. R&D/product development facilities.
Table 5 Spillovers from Japanese Firms
Negative Binomial Regressions







log R&D  -.0306  -.0286  -.0287
 (.0197)  (.0197)  (.0197)
log sales  -.1294  -.1243  -.1247
 (.0193)  (.0193)  (.0193)
log U.S. patents   .8827   .8754   .8772
 (.0283)  (.0285)  (.0285)
U.S. FDI   .0103   .0201   .0029
 (.0021)  (.0151)  (.0040)
Industry Dummies N.A. N.A. N.A.
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes
(1)  Indicates FDI measured as cumulative counts of all U.S. subsidiaries.
(2)  Indicates FDI measured as cumulative counts of acquired U.S. subsidiaries.
(3)  Indicates FDI measured as cumulative counts of U.S. R&D/product development facilities.
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Table 6 Spillovers to Japanese Firms
Negative Binomial Regressions,
Using a Time-Varying Measure of Technological Proximity







log R&D   .095   .094   .104
 (.040)  (.039)  (.040)
log sales   -.188   -.187  -.195
  (.030)   (.030)  (.030)
log U.S. patents   .655   .657   .660
 (.029)  (.029)  (.028)
Time-varying Proximity   1.91   1.91  1.77
  (.323)   (.325)  (.322)
U.S. FDI   .008   .046   .030
 (.004)  (.029)  (.008)
Industry Dummies N.A. N.A. N.A.
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes
(1)  Indicates FDI measured as cumulative counts of all U.S. subsidiaries.
(2)  Indicates FDI measured as cumulative counts of acquired U.S. subsidiaries.
(3)  Indicates FDI measured as cumulative counts of U.S. R&D/product development facilities.
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Table 7 Spillovers from Japanese Firms 
Negative Binomial Regressions, 
Using a Time-Varying Measure of Technological Proximity and 
a Summary Statistic of the Age Distribution 







    
log R&D   -.009  -.004   -.005 
   (.020)  (.020)   (.020) 
    
log sales   -.155   -.210  -.209 
   (.023)   (.023)  (.023) 
    
log U.S. patents   .826   .830   .833 
  (.034)  (.040)  (.037) 
    
Time-varying Proximity   1.31   1.38  1.32 
   (.323)   (.334)  (.333) 
    
Age   .903   .814  .842 
  (.109)   (.109)  (.110) 
    
U.S. FDI   .009  .019   .006 
  (.002)  (.015)  (.004) 
    
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
    
Log Likelihood -3843.1 -3856.6 -3856.2 
    
(1)  Indicates FDI measured as cumulative counts of all U.S. subsidiaries. 
(2)  Indicates FDI measured as cumulative counts of acquired U.S. subsidiaries.   
(3)  Indicates FDI measured as cumulative counts of U.S. R&D/product development facilities. 
 
